Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR or 'the Court') is in both crisis and transition. The nature of the crisis is not in doubt. Since the late 1990s the Court has been burdened with an overloaded docket. Some recent figures, the predecessors of which have been well-rehearsed, illustrate the enduring problems. The individual application rate rose from 61,300 in 2010 to 64,500 in 2011, and by January 2012, 151,000 cases were awaiting a decision about admissibility, 61.1% of which had been lodged against five states: Russia (26.6%), Turkey (10.5%), Italy (9.1%), Romania (8.1%) and Ukraine (6.8%). 1 The ECtHR rules less than 5% of individual applications admissible 2 and, every month, the gap between the influx of new applications and their disposal increases by over 1,000 cases. 3 Between 1959 and 1999 the Court delivered fewer than 1,000 judgments, yet by the end of December 2011 the figure had risen to over 14,000. 4 Between 1959 and 2011 some 93% of judgments on the meritsç 90% of all judgments including those concerning friendly settlement, striking out, just satisfaction, revision, preliminary objections and lack of jurisdictionçresulted in a finding of at least one violation. 5 In 2009, the Committee of Ministers reported that nearly 70% of the Court's judgments concern clear cut Convention violations, mostly stemming from the same systemic problem in the respondent state already condemned in an earlier application. 6 Nearly half the Court's judgments between its establishment in 1959 and 2011 concern applicationsç34,000 repetitive and 26,000 non-repetitiveçawaiting adjudication, nor the annual average increase of around 18,000. 14 The new Article 28(1)(b) three judge committee procedure for manifestly well-founded applications has not yet delivered the enhanced productivity anticipated. This is particularly true of the backlog of repetitive applications which, on account of their very low priority, go to the back of the queue. Nor, given the existing backlog and the rate at which it continues to increase, is this situation likely to improve without further changes. 15 Since, even with extra resources, the Court has the inherent capacity to dispose of on average only about 6,000 admissible applications per annumçabout 1,500 of which result in judgments on the meritsçit is clear that the case overload crisis is far from being conclusively resolved. 16 It is difficult to maintain, therefore, that the Court has a long-term future without further substantial reform. Two kinds of transition, therefore, appear inevitable; either 'to constitutionalisation' which is already underway, albeit slowly and so far only partially, or 'to stagnation or collapse' under the weight of relentlessly accumulating petitions. As an intergovernmental organisation, the Council of Europe can change only in an incremental, consensual, 'lowest-common-denominator' manner. 17 However, an essential prerequisite for the effective repair of any malfunctioning system or processçbe it organic, mechanical, or bureaucraticçis the correct diagnosis of its fundamental problems in the context of a clear understanding of its core purpose or objectives. Yet this is something the Council of Europe has been reluctant to do with respect to the Convention system. Indeed, at the Interlaken, Izmir and Brighton summits discussed below, it formally committed itself not to consider fundamentals until near the end of this decade. 18 Regrettably the lobby of those resisting change, ironically on the basis that this will best secure the Court's future, has so far been more effective than those advocating the kind of reforms required. But the delays and tinkering this has produced have fallen far 14 Preliminary Opinion of the Court, supra n 12 at paras 21^24; and Entin et al., supra n 3 at paras 4, 12 and 47. The study by Entin et al. gives a slightly higher figure for non-repetitive cases than that provided by the less recent Preliminary Opinion of the Court. 15 Preliminary Opinion of the Court, supra n 12 at para 9; and Entin et al., supra n 3 at paras 40^46. 16 
Two Parallel Debates
While there are, of course, important overlaps between the 'official' and the 'academic/judicial' debates, and equally important differences of opinion in both, each now also has several distinct characteristics arguably less prominent before.
A. The Official Debate
The official debate is dominated mostly by Strasbourg officials, diplomats and NGOs. Broadly speaking it is characterised by an unwillingness to discuss thoroughly what the primary functions of the Court could and should be, by minimalism, and by a mixture of confusion about, and hostility and indifference towards, constitutionalisation. For many years it has also been dominated by an abundance of official papers churning over largely the same 'shopping lists' of possible procedural and institutional reforms. Some of these, if they succeedçfor example an advisory opinion system and the otherwise welcome accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)ç are ironically more likely to add to the Court's case load than to reduce it. by the end of 2013: to include a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the Preamble to the Convention; to provide an optional protocol providing a 'preliminary reference procedure' (similar to that available in the EU context) which would enable national courts to seek, in on-going litigation, a non-binding advisory opinion from the ECtHR, the implications of which for a subsequent application to Strasbourg by one or more of the parties have yet to be clarified; 25 to reduce the time limit from six to four months between the final decision of the domestic legal system and the submission of an application to the ECtHR; to remove from Article 35(3)(b) the requirement that an application should have been 'duly considered by a domestic tribunal' before it can be rejected as inadmissible on the grounds that the applicant has suffered 'no significant disadvantage' as a result of the alleged violation; to amend Article 30 to permit Chambers to relinquish jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber whether or not one of the parties objects; and to amend Article 32(2) to ensure that judges are no older than 65 years when their term of office commences. The Brighton Declaration expresses concern about the rising backlog of admissible applications, but offers no credible solution apart from the possibility of extra judges being appointed (with potentially different terms of office and functions) which, as Entin, Jacque¤ , Mahoney and Wildhaber argue, is both problematic and unlikely to contribute anything of lasting value. 26 The Brighton Declaration also speculates that 'to secure the future effectiveness of the Convention system . . . it may be necessary to evaluate the fundamental role and nature of the Court'. With undeniable symbolism yet characteristic ambivalence, it adds that the Committee of Ministers might be required to 'carry out a comprehensive analysis of potential options' including 'how the Convention system in essentially its current form could be preserved, and consideration of more profound changes to how applications are resolved . . . with the aim of reducing the number of cases that have to be addressed by the Court'. 27 The objectives specified at Interlaken and Izmir to be achieved by the end of 2015 and 2019 are also reaffirmed.
B. The Academic/Judicial Debate
In contrast, what we call the 'academic/judicial debate' has the following characteristics. First, it is dominated by jurists, other scholars and, in their personal 24 Brighton Declaration, supra n 11. 25 Entin et al. argue that a system of advisory opinions should not be introduced until the Court gains more control of its own docket, nor, if and when it is, should it be at the expense of the right of individual application to Strasbourg, supra n 3 at paras 54^60. 26 Brighton Declaration, supra n 11 at paras 6 and 20(e); and Entin et al., supra n 3 at paras 42, 48. 27 Brighton Declaration, ibid. at paras 30, 31, 35(e).
capacities, certain former and current judges on the Court and other Council of Europe officials. However, unlike the official debate, there are also more serious and thorough attempts: to discern trends in the Court's activities and in the development of the Convention system including their interactions with national institutions, norms and processes; to identify the core contemporary functions of the Strasbourg process given the seismic changes in the wider European context since the end of the Cold War; to diagnose the central problems; and to identify coherent and integrated frameworks within which detailed reforms could be conceived and implemented.
What might be regarded as the two key questions facing the Convention system have also been framed more clearly in the academic/judicial debate than in its official counterpart. The first concerns how the Council of Europe can best encourage the institutionalisation of those national processes, which both reduce the risk of violation of Convention rights by public authorities and, where they have occurred, enable them to be effectively addressed at national level. The evidence shows that the impact of the ECHR on domestic legal systems 'varies widely across States and across time' and that the Court's impact is 'broad and pervasive' in some but 'weak in others'. 28 In 2011, the following states had the highest number of violations: Turkey (174), Russia (133), Ukraine (105) and Greece (73) . 29 States with the fewest 'raw score' annual average number of violations over the past decade or so include Ireland, Norway and Sweden, while France, Turkey and Italy have had the most. 30 These are not, however, unproblematic indicators of compliance. 31 But ranking states according to the official violation rate per head of population, as some have advocated, 32 risks introducing other distortions because, for example, a single judgment may cover a cluster of applications and may address a violation suffered by thousands or even tens of thousands. A ranking which also sought to factor in widely divergent national application rates, has yet to be attempted and it is doubtful if this would be worthwhile either because some states are more litigious than others. Keller and Stone Sweet argue that the key to improvement in national Convention compliance lies more in the effective 'reception', or 'domestification', of the ECHR in national legal systems than in its formal incorporation. 33 This means ensuring the Convention binds all national public authorities, ranks at least above statute in national constitutional systems, takes precedence over other competing legal norms, and is capable of The second key question facing the Convention system is how the scarce judicial resource represented by the Court can be deployed with maximum effect. Rather obviously, the Court itself has claimed the lead here. However, the scope for it to improve its own contribution is inevitably limited by the Convention framework. The answer to this question critically depends on how the Court's basic functions are understood. Strange though it may seem, even after over more than half a century, there is still no firm consensus on what these are.
Three Conceptual Frameworks
Two conceptual frameworksç'individual' and 'constitutional justice'ç dominated the academic/judicial debate, especially in the UK, prior to the finalisation of Protocol No 14 in 2004. 35 However, another perspective, 'pluralism'çlinked to wider debates about the characteristics of international legal regimesçalso now needs to be considered.
A. Individual Justice
The model of individual justice maintains that the Court exists primarily to redress Convention violations for the benefit of the particular individual making the complaint, with whatever constitutional or systemic improvements at the national level might thereby result. For anyone considering the merits of various human rights protection systems, this objective is likely to seem very attractive. 36 If governments did not hinder it, such a system would soon entice plenty of applicants. It would also put victims in the driving seat, allowing them to choose for themselves whether or not they wanted to complain, with no State or third party able to do so on their behalf. Cases and issues embarrassing for a government would, therefore, be much more difficult to suppress. By contrast, the reporting systems that characterise other human rights Debate about 'constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rightstreaties, including for example the Council of Europe's European Social Charter, 37 are state-managed and therefore entail a degree of shadow-boxing and attempts to gloss over real problems. Recourse to an international court also seems to offer redress to victims of human rights violations which states would otherwise be unwilling to grant, although admittedly the Convention itself guarantees only declaratory, pecuniary and procedural (but not substantive) remedies. However, a narrow and a broad sense of the term 'individual justice' need to be distinguished. With the inter-state applications process all but obsolete, virtually the only viable vehicle through which any judicial objective under the Convention system can currently be achieved is by judgments delivered in response to individual applications. The Court is, therefore, inescapably committed to the delivery of 'individual justice' in this narrow sense no matter what other goals it might have. The term 'individual justice' can also mean, in a broader sense, the attempt by the Convention system to ensure that every genuine victim of a Convention violation receives a judgment in their favour, however slight the violation, whatever the bureaucratic cost, whether or not the applicant receives compensation or any other tangible remedy, and whatever the likely impact on the state conduct or practice in question (call this 'the systematic delivery of individual justice'). While the principle of individual petition is likely to remain central to the Court's future, the systematic delivery of individual justice was never a credible goal for the Convention system and is even less so now. By refusing to acknowledge the need for radical change, those who remain wedded to this echo of an imagined past jeopardise the right to individual petition, the very thing they claim to hold most dear.
The idea that the systematic delivery of individual justice could and should be the Court's core function is untenable for three principal reasons. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that those who support it have never sought to offer a full and coherent argument in its favour. It has, instead, merely been implicitly invoked, in both pre-and post-Protocol No 14 debates, by those opposed to any reconsideration of the admissibility criteria for individual applications. 38 The first reason is that this was not what the Convention system was originally set up for. At its inception the ECHR was intended to prevent a recurrence of the atrocities of the Second World War, and to contribute to the peace of Western Europe in the context of the Cold War by providing an independent, transnational judicial forum mediating international disputes about rights violations. While the promotion of international peace in Europe is now shared at the transnational level with other institutions, particularly the European Union, the Convention's fundamental role and rationale continue to be the defence of the character and integrity of national political, constitutional and legal systems in European democracies through the language and medium of human rights, rather than benefiting individual applicants per se. Secondly, in view of the changes of the past half century there is simply no realistic prospect of justice being systematically delivered to every applicant with a credible complaint about a Convention violation. 39 And unless it is systematic, individual 'justice' risks becoming arbitrary. As already indicated the ECtHR rejects as inadmissible about 95% of the applications it receives, an admissibility rate not dissimilar to that of national constitutional courts. 40 Officially, about two thirds of these are rejected on the grounds of being 'manifestly ill-founded' (the lack of an arguable case). 41 However, what counts as a manifestly ill-founded application may span a spectrum of standards ranging from 'totally unmeritorious' to 'no prima facie breach'. 42 It is also na|« ve to regard the manifestly ill-founded criterion as an 'objective test' in either of two senses. It is, in the first place, only one of a number of possible criteria of admissibility, which could have been chosen at the inception of the ECHR for individual applications when these were not expected to be the main mechanism of enforcement. Nor is it 'objective' in the sense of being beyond the exercise of judgment and the interpretation of conduct, facts and norms. If it were otherwise the Court would not need to explain, as it sometimes does, why an application is 'manifestly' ill-founded. 43 Requiring reasons to be given in each of the 50,000 or so cases the Court currently rejects as inadmissible every year, 44 as some have proposed, 45 would also massively compound the case overload crisis. Indeed, some commentators maintain that many complaints are rejected on the 'manifestly ill-founded' criterion simply because the 
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Court does not have the resources to consider them properly. 46 Thirdly, for many applicants a judgment that their Convention rights have been violated is a hollow victory because levels of compensation are low and other rewards few. 47 Although states only rarely refuse to pay compensation where the Court has ordered it, the 'justice' delivered tends to be more symbolic than instrumental. For example, applicants who manage to persuade the Court that their conviction for a criminal offence occurred in circumstances where their right to fair trial was breached, will not automatically have their convictions quashed, although nowadays criminal proceedings are more likely to be reopened in such circumstances than before. In its broadest sense a 'constitution' refers to how any entity, for example the human body, is constructed and how it functions. In the narrowest sense it is confined only to the fundamental laws of the modern sovereign nation state as expressed in a single formal document. Various senses lie in between, including the terms upon which any deliberately constructed human associationçfrom a university sports club to an international organisationçis based, and how the rights and obligations of membership are defined and distributed. These may be found either in a canonical document created by the association's founders, and/or inferred from various sources including largely settled and consistent institutional practice, such as statutes having constitutional rank, customary and judge-made law. While all human associations with constitutions in this sense are likely to have had seminal 'constitutional moments', 'constitutionalisation' 49 çthe process by which a constitution is framed and institutionalisedçmay be protracted and may also vary in degree and intensity from place to place. A useful conception of a constitution in the (ii) The 'constitutional' characteristics of the ECtHR and Convention system
While it would be difficult to argue that the ECHR fulfils the first of Raz's criteria, it would also be difficult to deny that it largely fulfils the remainder, albeit unevenly across member states. As Sadurski concludes, it could, therefore, be said to be 'largely though not fully constitutional', with the ECtHR having become much more constitutional than before. 51 More specifically, the Council of Europe, the ECHR and the ECtHR could be said to have the following constitutional characteristics for the following reasons.
Firstly, as the Court has stated, the Convention is 'a constitutional instrument of European public order'. 52 Are we to conclude, as the negative attitude expressed in the official debate towards constitutionalisation (considered more fully later) suggests, that the Court has fundamentally misunderstood its own constitutive document?
Secondly, human rights litigation in national legal systems is, almost by definition, 'constitutional' because it raises fundamental questions about the distribution of benefits and burdens and about the structure of social and institutional relationships, because it tests the limits of the exercise of public power by reference to specified interests framed as rights, and because it impacts significantly only on the docket of the highest courts, particularly at the supreme or constitutional court level. Lower courts in all national legal systems are generally concerned with fact finding, the application of positive lawçwhich although derived from human rights is rarely directly about human rights themselvesçand the management of various kinds of official discretion. For example, the UK's Human Rights Act 1998, which makes Convention rights litigable in domestic courts, is virtually invisible in the routine legal process, featuring, for example, in only two per cent of reported appellate cases and considerably fewer at first instance. 53 It is, however, referred to in about a third of House of Lords/Supreme Court cases although it substantially affects the results in only about one-tenth. 54 It is difficult to understand, therefore, how human rights litigation with such a clear constitutional Debate about 'constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rightscomplexion at the national level could lose this characteristic when it is taken to Strasbourg.
Thirdly, the reverse is also the case. The fact, as recent research shows, that the ECHR is increasingly acquiring 'constitutional status' in member states, albeit in different ways in different places, 55 poses an intriguing question for those who reject the constitutionalisation thesis: how could it gain such status at the national level without having it at the transnational level in some sense already? 56 Fourthly, to a large extent, the ECtHR decides broadly the same kind of issues as a domestic supreme or constitutional court, and also in largely similar ways. This involves exploring whether the aims invoked to restrict a specific human right are legitimate, whether the restrictions have a sufficient legal basis, and whether they are proportionate and necessary in a democratic society. 57 Indeed the dozen or so principles of interpretation used by the Courtç for example, democracy, the rule of law, effective protection of human rights, margin of appreciation, subsidiarity, proportionality and so onçare effectively constitutional principles because they raise two distinct and quintessentially constitutional questions: the 'normative question' of what a given Convention right means including its relationship with other rights and collective interests, and the 'institutional question' of which institutionsçjudicial/ non-judicial, national/Europeançshould be responsible for providing the answer. 58 The central constitutional issue raised by the Convention is, therefore, how its basic purpose can be realised institutionally. This is more fundamental than the distribution of competence between national institutions, on the one hand, and the ECtHR on the other since the function of national non-judicial bodies differs under the Convention from that of both national courts and the ECtHR which together share similar, though not identical, responsibilities. The central constitutional question therefore becomesçhow can responsibility for rights protection and the democratic pursuit of the public interest be distributed between judicial and non-judicial institutions each acting in accordance with the rule of law?
Greer has argued that answering this question, while remaining faithful to the Convention's underlying object and purpose, requires a re-arrangement of the primordial soup of principles of interpretation, and a re-structuring, but not a substantive revision, of the orthodox principle of effective protection of human rights, as well as the principles of legality/rule of law, and the principle of democracy. This produces three primary constitutional principles each exercised according to the principle(s) of legality, procedural fairness and rule of law, to which the remaining principles of interpretation are subordinate.
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The 'rights' principle holds that, in a democratic society, Convention rights should be protected by national courts and by the ECtHR through the medium of law. The 'democracy' principle maintains that, in a democratic society, collective goods/public interests should be pursued by democratically accountable national non-judicial public bodies within a framework of law. The principle of 'priority to Convention rights' mediates the relationship between the other two by insisting that Convention rights take procedural and evidential, but not conclusive substantive, priority over the democratic pursuit of the public interest, according to the terms of given Convention provisions. Providing the role of the principle of legality is recognised as integral to these three primary constitutional principles, little of consequence results from counting them as three rather than four. The function of the remaining subordinate principles of interpretation is to provide a complex web of overlapping and underpinning support for the primary ones.
A fifth constitutional characteristic of the Convention system concerns, as Gardbaum and others have pointed out, the 'ongoing process of implicit constitutionalisation in both the human rights system and international law as a whole'. Both the international human rights regime and international law itself, nevertheless, continue to be 'constrained by the still important role of state consent and the failure of human rights generally to bind international organizations ' . 60 Debates about the constitutionalisation of the 62 have spawned a sophisticated literature that has grown rapidly over the past few years, the principal insights of which will be considered later.
(iii) Conceptions of 'constitutional justice'
There are also various conceptions of 'constitutional justice'. 63 At one end of the continuum, is the narrow view that 'constitutional justice' is limited to the decisions and judgments of national constitutional or supreme courts operating in a legal and political system with a single constitutional document empowering them to annul legislation, quash executive action, and overturn the decisions of lower courts principally when constitutional rights have been violated. At the other end, is the wider view that it includes the decisions and judgments of any court empowered to rule authoritatively and finally within a given legal system on whether fundamental rights have been breached by non-judicial authorities. In the latter sense, and according to the constitutional characteristics of the Convention system identified above, the Court is already a kind of constitutional, or quasi-constitutional court. It has itself affirmed, for example, that while 'the primary purpose of the Convention system is to provide individual relief, its mission is also to determine issues on public policy grounds in the common interest', albeit a problematic order of priorities considered further below. 64 This also appears to be what the Brighton Declaration means when it states that, while the Court's function is to act as a 'safeguard for individuals whose rights and freedoms are not secured at the national level', in the longer-term and in 'response to more effective implementation at the national level', it should also focus more of its attention on 'serious or widespread violations, systematic and structural problems, and important questions of interpretation and application of the Convention'. 65 As already indicated, the core challenge presented by the case overload crisis concerns how the scarce judicial resource the ECtHR represents can be most efficiently and effectively deployed. It is difficult to maintain that these requirements are currently being fulfilled not least because, also as already indicated, considerable amounts of time are consumed by admissibility decisions, the Court itself considers 64% of its own judgments as of 'little legal interest', and between a half and two-thirds of its judgments concern repeat applications. 66 Inherent in the notion of 'constitutional justice' in the ECHR context is the idea that the Convention system should ensure that cases are both selected and adjudicated by the ECtHR in a manner which contributes most effectively to the identification, condemnation, and resolution of violations, particularly those which are serious for the applicant, for the respondent state (because, for example, they are built into the structure or modus operandi of its public institutions), or for Europe as a whole (because, for example, they may be prevalent in more than one state).
Four relatively recent developments indicate that, in this sense, constitutionalisation is already underway, albeit hesitantly and slowly. Firstly, the Court now groups similar applications for a single decision or judgment into what are effectively 'class actions', a policy encouraged by the Brighton Declaration. 67 In 2011, for example, 1,157 judgments disposed of 1,511 applications. 68 Secondly, the Court also prioritises applications in accordance with their seriousness and deals with the most serious first, a formal recognition that some meritorious cases are more worthy of examination at the international level than others. 69 Thirdly, the new admissibility criterion in Article 35(3)(b), which embodies a limited seriousness test, was intended to result in more cases being ruled inadmissible by enabling applications disclosing a prima facie case of Convention violation to be rejected where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, the case has been duly considered by a domestic tribunal, and there are no other human rights reasons for adjudication at Strasbourg. However, this new test has been a dismal failure so far. Between 1 June 2010 and 31 May 2011 applications ruled inadmissible by reference to it constituted only 0.34% of all applications with respect to which Chambers and the Grand Chamber made an admissibility decision in both separate and joint proceedings. 70 Fourthly, the boldest attempt to tackle the problem of defective national legislation or practice has undoubtedly been the so-called 'pilot judgment procedure', an 'emphatic expression', according to Sadurski, of the 'constitutional turn' in the Court's function. 71 Developed by the Court independently of Protocol No 14, this enables a ruling to be made on a particular application 66 See sources in supra nn 6, 9, 10. 67 Brighton Declaration, supra n 11 at para 20(d). Entin et al., supra n 3 at para 12; Analysis of Statistics 2011, supra n 3 at 5; and Fribergh, supra n 12 at 119. 70 Greer,'The New Admissibility Criterion', in Besson, supra n 12 at 40; and Preliminary Opinion of the Court, supra n 12 at para 10. 71 Sadurski, supra n 51 at 450.
Debate about 'constitutionalising' the European Court of Human Rightsallowing the many thousands, or tens of thousands, of potential complaints about the same violation to be diverted back to national authorities. However, according to a recent study, pilot judgments have only been 'relatively successful' in some contexts but less so in others. 72 They are not, therefore, the panacea for the problem of case overload some may have hoped. Three kinds of judgment relating to systemic violations of the Convention by member states have been distinguished. First, up to January 2010, six 'full' pilot judgments had been delivered in cases against Poland, Russia, Moldova, Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina in relation to a range of problems including the adequacy of compensation for the state seizure of private property, the non-enforcement of domestic court judgments and the excessive length of domestic legal proceedings. In these the ECtHR both expressly invoked the term 'pilot judgment' to describe its own approach, and identified a systemic Convention violation. The respondent state was reminded of the need to address the source, and of its obligation under Article 46 of the ECHR to abide by the final Strasbourg judgment. The Court also stipulated, in the operative part of its judgment, that general measures were required from national authorities and, typically, adjourned all other cases arising from the same problem. The adoption of this, the full pilot judgment procedure, depends on a mixture of 'practical and political considerations, as well as legal factors'. 73 In the second type, 'quasi-pilot' judgments, the Court identifies a systemic problem and invokes Article 46, but does not expressly describe its judgment as a 'pilot judgment', nor does it prescribe general measures in the operative part or, subject to certain exceptions, does it adjourn other similar cases. The third type are judgments, some of which predate the pilot judgment debate, which resemble 'quasi-pilot' judgments in all particulars except for the lack of an express invocation of Article 46. The most critical issues that have arisen in the debate about pilot judgments are: what determines their effectiveness and how could this be enhanced? According to Leach et al., the key factor is the cooperation of respondent states, particularly recognition of the specific systemic problem by national constitutional or other higher courts before a pilot judgment has been delivered. The authors claim that lack of cooperation at the national level may be due to 'the extent of the political will . . . the domestic political agenda, the status of the Convention in national law, . . . technical capacity and financial burdens'. 74 'Reputational pressures' are also listed but not explained. (iv) Criticisms of the 'constitutionalisation thesis' While the 'constitutionalisation thesis' has been rejected in the 'official debate' this is much less true of the academic/judicial debate. Although not universally accepted here either, Harmsen's claim that '(m)ajority academic opinion' has come down 'squarely on the side of the individual justice thesis' is difficult to reconcile with Hennette-Vauchez's contribution to the same collection of essays considered further below. 75 Some legitimate concerns about constitutionalisation, nevertheless, need to be addressed.
The lack of a sustained defence of the case for 'individual justice' is mirrored in the official debate by the absence of a systematic critique of the arguments for 'constitutionalisation' and 'constitutional justice', or the articulation of any coherent alternative including pluralism. Instead all that has been offered so far are sweeping generalisations often rejecting the very notion that the Convention or Court have any constitutional characteristics or functions, typically confined to a few sentences, and implicitly referenced to the narrow nation-state model of constitutionalism. This confusing statement, which appears both to reject the constitutional character of the Court and simultaneously rejects and endorses the constitutional nature of the ECHR, embodies several misconceptions, some of which also feature in the academic/judicial debate. First, the 'constitutionalisation thesis' is by no means a recent development. As Hennette-Vauchez points out 'multiple key Convention people have sided with a constitutional reading of the ECHR' from its very foundation. 77 According to this commentator, these Second, the case for constitutional justice does not advocate that the Court should become a 'constitutional court'. It maintains, rather, that the Court is effectively one already and that this is a role that should be more formally acknowledged and more consistently performed. The case for constitutional justice is, therefore, much more about consolidation than it is about transformation. 78 The key question, therefore, considered more fully below, concerns how enhanced fidelity to its own inherent constitutional character would contribute to resolving the problems the Court faces.
Third, exponents of constitutionalisation or constitutional justice do not argue, as some critics suppose, 79 that the ECtHR should resemble national constitutional or supreme courts in all significant particulars, much less that it should become like the US Supreme Court with the power to annul national legislation. For at least four reasons the ECtHR does not, nor does any credible conception of constitutionalisation require it to have, this kind of authority. Firstly, its jurisdiction is limited to declaring whether or not the Convention has been breached. 80 It does not have the power to annul legislation or, including under the pilot judgment process, to prescribe to states precisely what needs to be done in order to correct a violation. Secondly, the role of the Court is subsidiary to that of national authorities that have the primary responsibility for ensuring Convention rights are not violated in the first place. 81 Thirdly, the margin of appreciation doctrine legitimately leaves considerable scope for a range of equally Convention-compliant national norms, institutions and processes. Fourthly, whether or not a judgment of the Court is effectively implemented at national level will depend upon both the willingness and capacity of national institutions on the one hand, and negotiation with the Committee of Ministers in the supervision of the execution of judgments on the other. Indeed, far from regarding the principles of subsidiarity, margin of appreciation and proportionality as characterising non-constitutionalised 78 Wildhaber, Foreword to Greer (2006) , supra n 19 at xiii; see also Keller and Stone Sweet, supra n 28 at 13. 79 Hennette-Vauchez, supra n 35 at 153. 80 See Articles 19, 32(1), 45, 47^49 ECHR. 81 See, for example, Christoffersen, supra n 35 at 183^5. pluralist legal orders, Klabbers et al. rightly regard them as integral to international constitutionalism. 82 The case against constitutional justice can, in fact, be turned on its head. Is it possible that any modern court, capable of authoritatively condemning legislative and executive action from the standpoint of an independent judicial interpretation of formally specified fundamental rights, could legitimately exist and function in the absence of any constitutional framework whatever? A fourth misconception is that limiting the ECtHR to the adjudication of only serious alleged violations, as the constitutionalisation thesis suggests, would threaten the right of individual petition and would undermine the Court's legitimacy. Contrary to what many NGOs and others appear to think, the right of individual petition is a right to make a complaint, not a right to have it judged on the merits. 83 No applicant who can currently lodge an application at Strasbourg would be unable to do so if seriousness were to become the core substantive criterion of admissibility. Indeed, the vast bulk of the docket of the constitutional courts in Germany and Spain, and of most other European national constitutional courts, consist of individual applications the admissibility of which hinges upon the seriousness of the complaint. 84 Fifth, there is no substance either in the fear that acknowledging the ECtHR's constitutional character threatens the independence of national constitutional courts. Although there may be differences of opinion as to how the constitutional function of each of these types of court should be interpreted, properly understood their roles are complementary and not antagonistic. As Fassbender puts it: '[I]t is a profound misunderstanding to equate the advancement of the constitutional idea in international law with a weakening of the institution of the independent state.' 85 Sixth, it has been claimed that individual and constitutional justice are not mutually exclusive but twin goals that the Court must deliver simultaneously, albeit appropriately balanced. 86 But as Greer has argued, it is 'trite to assert that . . . (the Court) . . . ought to dispense both individual and constitutional 82 Some may also be concerned, seventh, that 'constitutionalisation' is not quite the right way in which to frame the pursuit of greater efficiency and effectiveness and that a different label might avoid some of the misconceptions about what this term implies. Possible substitutesçfor example 'systemic justice', a 'systemic approach to alleged Convention violations', a 'holistic approach'çmight serve equally well. But determining precisely what they mean raises at least as many questions.
Eighth, it has also been claimed that constitutionalisation would make the selection of cases for adjudication at Strasbourg, pragmatic, unprincipled and unpredictable, too heavily reliant on figures and numbers, liable to ignore the underlying issues in complaints, and vulnerable to 'moral panics'. 88 It is said that, in its turn, this would dilute the existing level of human rights protection, introducing relativistic standards rather than tailor-made responses to each individual application, which would damage the credibility of the Court and diminish its pedagogical function in a heterogeneous international community. These concerns are, however, misconceived for the following reasons. Firstly, precisely the same criticisms could be laid at the door of every constitutional or supreme court in every member state of the Council of Europe, yet no one would seriously do so. Secondly, national public opinion tends to accord constitutional courts higher esteem and legitimacy than any other national public institution. 89 Thirdly, for the ECtHR to select cases for adjudication on the basis of a seriousness criterion is no less predictable, unprincipled or discretionary than the 'manifestly ill founded' test which it would replace. Fourthly, the fact that the Court spends most of its time adjudicating complaints which do not raise issues of particular significance hardly contributes to its credibility, legitimacy, and pedagogical function. Fifthly, creating more time for the ECtHR to spend on issues of the greatest significance would, therefore, enhance rather than diminish the prospects of these objectives being attained. Finally, the most powerful criticism of the 'constitutionalisation thesis', considered in the following section, comes from those who argue that pluralism provides a better approach.
C. Pluralism
The pluralist model comes in two main forms. One is the claim that the Court has many functions and not the binary alternatives suggested by the models of individual and constitutional justice. The other is the view that the Convention system is part of an interlocking plurality of legal systems in both contemporary Europe and beyond.
(i) A plurality of functions Various commentators have identified a range of functions discharged by the Court. C°ali, for example, distinguishes four: '(1) to hold states parties to account; (2) to protect minority groups and views; (3) to trigger reform; and (4) to uphold a model of rights-bearing based on individuals rather than citizens'. 90 While stating that 'it would be difficult to conceive of the ECtHR as a constitutional court', she nevertheless concedes that the Court's central purpose is to establish 'the accountability of individual Member states on the specific subject-matter of human rights protection,' 91 a function which, together with the others, has constitutional significance in spite of the author's denial. C°ali also maintains that these four functions should 'be taken into account when admissibility criteria are established upon the coming into force of Protocol No. 14,' 92 but declines to say what this means or how it would work in practice. Keller and Stone Sweet also maintain that the Court has several functions depending upon which Convention rights and which states are involved. They claim, for example, that the Court behaves like a 'kind of High Cassation Court' when it comes to procedure, an 'international watchdog' regarding grave human rights violations and massive breakdowns in the rule of law, and an 'oracle of constitutional rights interpretation' in relation to Articles 8^11 and 14 of the ECHR. 93 However, crucially, they also acknowledge that 'the Court is increasingly engaged in delivering . . . ' Wildhaber has distinguished six functions, 95 each only capable of being properly harmonised and prioritised by the Court's core constitutional mission. First, the ECtHR filters applications, rejecting as inadmissible the vast majority on formal grounds (for example, non-exhaustion of domestic remedies), mixed grounds (for example, incompatibility with the Convention), or substantive grounds (for example, being 'manifestly ill-founded'). Nevertheless, those applicants whose petitions are rejected will, at least, have had the opportunity to raise a complaintçthe second, 'wailing wall', function. Four further functions in cases judged on the merits are: borderline fine-tuning, responding to grave breaches of human rights, addressing structural or systemic problems and preventing arbitrariness by delivering administrative justice. As far as borderline fine-tuning is concerned, the ECtHR takes pride in its evolutive interpretation of the Convention in the light of progressively developing social values and changing individual needs, with some of the key players apparently believing they have a duty to extend the reach of Convention rights as far as possible.
96
The ECtHR has also, unfortunately, had to deal with clear cases of grave and massive human rights breaches, including for example, random killings, torture, disappearances, rapes, prolonged illegal detention, thoroughly unfair or arbitrary proceedings, and systematic attempts to eliminate political opposition. There is little doubt that a human rights court should condemn such grave breaches as a matter of the utmost priority even though the governments concerned will often resent its intervention and may denounce its judgments as political rather than legal.
As already indicated, one of the biggest problems facing the Convention system is how to deal with large numbers of well-founded applications deriving from structural or systemic problems in member states which generate either repetitive or mass claims. The best-known examples are the excessive length of court proceedings and the failure to execute final court judgments, problems that continue to exist in many of Europe's states. 97 No matter how many cases concerning these difficulties arrive at the door of the Court, the fact that each applicant is equally aggrieved may suggest that each case should be examined with equal care. But it is difficult to see how this is possible given that over 150,000 applications are currently awaiting an admissibility decision. 98 A solution, which the Court and others find attractive, would be for these cases to be dealt with by respondent states and the Committee of Ministers as an execution problem. 99 Finally, it can also be observed that, in the context of recent complaints about inadequate compensation for hidden or de facto expropriations or excessively high fines or fees, the ECtHR is becoming not only a quasi-Constitutional Court for Europe, but also effectively a sort of a 'European quasi-Supreme Administrative Court'. 100 While the ECtHR can be relied upon to work hard to harmonise and reconcile its various functions, this task is inevitably delicate and depends upon the standpoints and agendas of the various players, especially the judges themselves. 'Judicial activists' and 'perfectionists' 101 are likely to consider the Court's mission to be, first, the steady expansion of human rights on a widening front, second, the abandonment of notions such as subsidiarity and margin of appreciation in favour of ambitious standard-setting, and, third, the renunciation of the distinction between those cases which, on the one hand, require 'routine adjudication' or 'fine-tuning', and, on the other, those relating to 'grave breaches'. The implication is that all these distinctions would be replaced by the simple concept of 'human rights violations writ large'. On the other hand, advocates of 'judicial self-restraint', 'realism', and 'minimalism' 102 would go less far. For them the ECtHR's inescapable dependence upon, and interconnectedness with, the various national courts, parliaments and governments, necessarily involves a sense of proportion and prioritisation. From this perspective, the Court provides, above all, inspiration, guidelines, minimal standards, and a programme of 'realistic idealism'/'idealistic realism'; that is to say idealism tempered by a full appreciation of what the Convention can and cannot achieve. 103 Given the impossible workload, we believe it would be more honest and transparent, and more consistent with the Court's constitutional mission, to acknowledge the following. Firstly, many applications cannot and should not be examined whether or not they disclose a credible violation. This is effectively what, in a very limited manner, the new Article 35(3)(b) test does. Secondly, the ECtHR will, inevitably, have to continue to handle claims alleging grave breaches of the ECHR, since this is a task no human rights court worthy of the name can avoid. Thirdly, with respect to structural or systemic problems, the Court must decide what its guiding principles should be. While the details should be entrusted to national authorities, the ECtHR must retain ways and means of periodically controlling national execution in individual cases. But, given case overload, it is simply not feasible to rely extensively on a case-by-case control by the Court alone. It is, in any case, doubtful if a European Court could, by itself, discipline national systems which, for whatever reason, simply do not play by the rules of the pan-European game. As to routine adjudication and fine-tuning, in open societies judicial attitudes will necessarily oscillate between more activist and more self-restrained approaches. For example, a large number of Grand Chamber judgments are accompanied by dissenting and separate opinions because judicial agendas and perceptions differ, and because it is difficult to deny that there are various ways of safeguarding most human rights. Ideally the ECtHR should develop an acute sense of its own effectiveness and priorities, and a realistic sense of what should be secondary. This is, after all, merely the logic of subsidiarity, which entails that, in many respects, the primary sites for the protection of human rights are, and will continue to be, decentralised. 104 It is difficult, therefore, to deny that, in a fundamental sense, these are all constitutional issues because they concern deep questions about the interpretation and implementation of rights and about how relevant processes should be institutionally managed.
(ii) A plurality of systems The second sense of the term 'pluralism' refers to a type of post-national legal regime. 105 In this sense it is essentially a macro-level descriptive-analytical framework with normative implications, 106 whereas the case for constitutionalisation in the Convention context is largely normative and stems directly from the debate about how the Court's application-overload crisis might be resolved. 107 Krisch, perhaps the leading exponent of the pluralist conception of the European human rights legal regime, observes that the ECtHR has gained such remarkable authority over the past half-century or so, that its judgments enjoy high rates of compliance, and are regularly cited in most member states. 108 As many others would also acknowledge, this means that it nevertheless include a commitment to democracy and the rule of law, the limitation of the exercise of public power by a set of justiciable 'constitutional' rights found in the ECHR, a Court to settle complaints about their alleged violation, and another institution (the Committee of Ministers) to supervise the execution of the Court's judgments. However, for several reasons, the Convention's constitutional landscape is also undeniably pluralistic, polyvalent, and heterarchical, rather than unitary, monistic, and rigidly hierarchical. Firstly, a significant degree of harmony and convergence can be observed, based as much on political compromise as upon legal prescription where the question of ultimate authority is open and contested. But these are not only inevitable features of any international constitutional order; they are also common in national constitutional systems and processes as well. 125 Secondly, the Convention provides the functional equivalent of a constitution for a 'partial' rather than 'full' polity, that is to say one with executive and judicial but no legislative functions. Moreover, the ECHR is a creature of the Council of Europe and the extent to which it binds the parent body, as well as its members, is debatable. Thirdly, not all states are equally integrated into it. Several national constitutional courts have, for example, been reluctant to follow the ECtHR when they deem its interpretation of Convention rights inconsistent with their interpretation of their own national constitutional rights. But, the fact that national courts may not share Strasbourg's interpretation of what are essentially the same fundamental rights found in different documents, does not mean that each court, and each document, are not components of a common, though pluralistic, 'multi-verse' of constitutional systems. As other commentators have pointed out, the unevenness of a constitutional process does not necessarily deprive it of its constitutional character. 126 In fact, complex and contingent commitments such as those exhibited by the Convention system are the hallmarks of constitutionalised international law. 127 It may be an overstatement to claim, as Gardbaum does, that the 'ECHR has arrived at a roughly similar point of constitutionalisation as federalisation, albeit via a different route'. 128 But, in our view, the Court and Convention system can, nevertheless, be said to display a 'commonwealth model of constitutionalism' 129 or, a unique form of 'constitutional pluralism'. This has two main implications for the future. Firstly, there are good reasons for believing that the Court should have much more control over its own docket, not least because all modern legal systems are based on an increasingly restricted selection of cases, usually on the basis of a judicial assessment of their seriousness or significance, as litigation moves from lower to higher levels. 130 It is difficult, therefore, to see how, and why, the ECtHR could and should be more generous. The myth of a right of unrestricted individual access, therefore, needs to be more explicitly abandoned in favour of a system with more realistic objectives. Since the Court cannot fully adjudicate more than 1,500 applications per year, 131 we believe it should be able to select the 1,500 it considers the most important and reject the rest. Instead of disposing of thousands of cases administratively and declaring applications manifestly ill-founded which may not be so obviously manifestly ill-founded, such an approach would be more predictable, transparent and honest. It would also focus attention upon real priorities, and would serve the overall protection of human rights better. In our view the debate now, therefore, needs to focus on the various ways this result might be achieved. It has recently been argued, for example, that a more robust application of Article 37(1)(c) 132 would enable low priority, though well-founded applications, to be struck off the list by unanimous decision of a panel of at least three judges according to criteria developed over time by Convention case law. 133 Alternatively, the Convention could be amended to replace all the current substantive admissibility tests with a single test based on seriousness which, in its turn, would have significant implications for the jurisdiction of the Grand Chamber. 134 The Court itself accepts that, in the longer term, a new admissibility criterion or other ways of excluding some well-founded cases from adjudication of the merits, might be justified. 135 The second implication is that the Court should adjudicate the tiny fraction of the total number of applications it receives in a more 'constitutional' or principled mannerçthat is to say by seeking the best, and most consistent, interpretation of the Convention as a whole and with a view to maximising the effects of each judgment both in the respondent state and in Council of Europe states generally.
